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DEVELOPING NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE IN THE ASIAN
HEARTLAND: ROLE OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES
By  J. Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia)
Changing strategic environment
In the post Cold War decade, especially after the tragic 9/11 events of
2001 and the 2003 war in Iraq, international security environment is substantially
changing, including the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region.
Predominance of today’s only hyper-power is not only demonstrated and felt
strongly in international relations, but is leaving its imprint on tackling the
major international issues. As of today the predominant position of U.S. is
indisputable. It has not yet been affected by the shifts that are underway in the
world, including in Europe and Asia. Expansion of NATO to the East (reaching
26 members), expansion of the European Union (reaching 25 members) and the
steps undertaken to adopt a common EU Constitution that would coordinate
even closer foreign, trade and economic policies of its members, are yet to make
themselves felt in the Transatlantic relations.
In the East, globalization and the rise of China as the regional pre-eminent
power are forcing the regional States to work closer politically and economically,
with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) serving as their multilateral venue, if
not as the negotiating or decision making fora(y).  As a result of increasing
American pre-eminence on the world stage, Russia and China are stressing the
need to multi-polarize the world and to that end they have declared forging a
strategic partnership. However, the realities of power and imperatives of geo-
economics demonstrate the limits of Russian-Chinese strategic collaboration,
with each one following its economic and other interests and acceding to U.S.
pressures.
The use at times of indiscriminate or dis-proportional force to fight
terrorism and introduction of the doctrine of pre-emptive strike in Afghanistan
and Iraq are raising legitimate questions as to where all this could lead and
what, if any, role the United Nations Security Council is to play on questions
pertaining to maintaining international peace and security, what role the
Council’s Permanent Members (PMs) could really play.
With the above changes, security perceptions and policies of many States
are undergoing reappraisals and substantial changes. At the strategic level,
many States are making fighting terrorism at the regional and global level, if not
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their security, then foreign policy priority, with all the ensuing consequences.
Some regimes are using the fight against terrorism as a pretext to crack down on
their political opponents and adversaries. Ad hoc coalitions are formed to deal
with emerging security related issues, while the existing UN based international
security mechanism is either being brushed aside or turned to when surpassing
it does not yield the expected results.
Realities of nuclear age
In the field of nuclear security, contrary to the expectations, the end of the
Cold War did not bring “nuclear peace dividends”. The unfolding international
events,  including the recently busted nuclear-supply chain that had been
operated by Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist Abdul Qader Khan, demonstrates
that XXI century might prove even more dangerous than the previous one,
unless resolute collective measures are taken to stop the spread of nuclear
weapons or its technology. Whether that is possible depends on the collective
will and actions of the members of the international community. The role of the
P5 in this regard is of crucial importance. However, unfortunately they are
sending mixed signals. U.S. and the Russian Federation are taking steps to
reduce their nuclear stockpiles; the P5, together with other States, are trying to
check the smuggling in nuclear weapons technology and uncontrolled sale of
dual-use nuclear technology and equipment and to secure radioactive
resources1, etc. All this is welcomed and hailed by the international community.
On the other hand, double standard is being applied in dealing with the
non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) with some being favored while some
others discriminated.  Companies of some of the P5 or those of their closest
allies are implicated in the clandestine and burgeoning nuclear weapons
technology black-market. U.S., the strongest among the P5,  is proceeding with
its national missile defense and is lifting the ban on research on the so-called
low-yield and bunker-busting nuclear weapons that are designed specifically
to attack conventional enemy forces and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
hidden deep underground. Many believe that this would fuel regional nuclear
arms race and lower the threshold of the admissibility of the use of nuclear
weapons, making thus the use of such weapons “thinkable”. This cannot but
adversely affect nuclear non-proliferation. It could be said that today the danger
of proliferation of WMD and the means of their delivery are becoming one of
the main sources instability.
1 See Group of Eight joint statement of 3 June, 2003
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The recent eastward expansion of NATO, that brought it at the borders of
Russia, could impel the latter to accept NATO’s own cold war era  doctrine that
superiority in conventional arms of the adversary needs to be countered by
more robust nuclear arsenal with all the ensuing doctrinal and practical
consequences2. Absence of any commitment by the new member States of
NATO not to allow stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories would
only add validity to proponents of the nuclear deterrence doctrine within the
Russian military and national security elite.
At the regional level, the fight against terrorism in West Asia will surely
result in changing of the regional strategic landscape with its broad geo-political
implications for the Middle East and adjacent regions. The question is still
open as to what kind of change will it bring – more radicalization of the region,
its democratization or a mix of both. The Middle East Road Map seems to be at
an impasse, overtaken by violence and the unfolding events on the territories
of the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
In South Asia, Indian Prime Minister’s last year’s talks in China resulted
in opening of further opportunity for these two Asian giants to develop their
political and trade relations. However, the Indo-Pakistani relations, relations of
the two de facto nuclear-weapon States, have not yet fully normalized, with
some signs that after the “cricket diplomacy” of this spring the two sides might
move closer to addressing the contentious issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Due to
discovery of enormous oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region and global focus
on Afghanistan and Iraq, the Central Asian region is acquiring greater strategic
importance. Iran’s recent decision to speed up cooperation with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and resolve the outstanding issues3 and be
fully transparent in its future dealings with the Agency are being welcomed not
only in the region, but well beyond it. At the same time Iran’s experience
demonstrated yet again the flaws and weaknesses of the NPT regime that need
to be addressed and “fixed”.
In our Northeast Asian region, the hopes of further normalization of
relations between the Koreas have not been realized and the situation on the
peninsula is still fraught with complications due to the question relating to
DPRK’s nuclear policy and activity.
2 Though NATO has repeatedly indicated that  it had no intention, no plan and no
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of new member States, it  has also
nevertheless ruled out the possibility of abandoning the option of doing so.
3 these issues include the origin of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) discovered
recently and the purpose of nuclear centrifuges which could be used to produce weapons-
grade material
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The post 9/11 world realized that nuclear weapons ambitions are not limited
to States only, but that terrorist groups also have such ambitions. It was revealed
that attempts had been made to obtain nuclear weapons or their components
(as well as of chemical and biological weapons); some groups had even declared
that acquiring nuclear weapons was their “religious duty”. Easy access to
nuclear technology, including technology for enriching uranium and processing
plutonium, coupled with the existence of demand for such weapons on the
black market make the matter more dangerous and the situation more volatile.
The Role of the P5
The danger of nuclear weapons proliferation is not the sole pressing
world issue. Today the international community needs to focus on the issues
related to ensuring basic  human security, as reflected in the Millennium
Development Goals, such as eliminating extreme poverty, coping with HIV/
AIDS pandemic, ensuring of basic human rights and freedoms, addressing the
acute environmental issues, including provision of safe drinkable water to the
overwhelming majority of the world’s population, etc. However, the political,
strategic and technological developments mentioned earlier distract from
focusing on these pressing issues and demand further efforts to halt vertical
and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In all these the policies of the
P5, their obligations both as NWSs and as the PMs of the UN Security Council
with the veto power, are of decisive importance.
The role of the P5 in the matters of maintaining and strengthening of
international peace and security is exceptionally important. During the Cold
War and the bipolar world the fate of the world depended to a great extent on
the relations between the two super-powers and their allies.  The track record of
the P5 during the Cold War has been mixed. In the post Cold War period despite
raised expectations, their track record has hardly improved. The vast majority
of States increasingly believe that the P5 are not doing enough to live up to
their responsibilities neither as PMs of the Security Council nor as NWSs
under the NPT regime.  Some even believe that the P5 have failed to meet fully
the responsibilities and expectations under the UN Charter and the NPT and
therefore the present arrangements need to be changed. Others, mindful of the
realities of power and the enormous responsibilities of the PM/P5, are somehow
less categorical in their judgment.
With respect to NPT, most believe that the central bargain struck in 1968
in the treaty between NWSs and NNWSs have not been kept by the former,
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that the P5 are ignoring their legally binding obligation under Article VI of the
NPT to engage in good faith negotiations with respect to nuclear disarmament.
It is believed that actions of NWSs, including development of new types of
nuclear weapons,  ignoring ICJ conclusion on their obligation to pursue in
good faith nuclear disarmament negotiations “in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control” are but clear examples of such highhanded and
irresponsible attitude. It is believed that in some cases the P5, if their own
national interests are not directly affected,  tend to “look the other way”.  In
some cases direct negotiations are altogether avoided or the issues are not
addressed properly.
The reasons behind such attitude of the P5 in many cases are seen as lack
of political will, national strategic motivations and calculations, profit motives,
leverage building, double standard, complacency with the existing status quo,
rivalry in one area (that was especially evident during the Cold War) and
protecting the common interest of NWSs as a group in another area. All this in
the past half a century, especially since the end of the Cold War, has produced
an exclusive “political culture” among the P5 and the corresponding decision-
making that are at times secretive, non-transparent and self-serving.
As the foremost nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia bear the principal
responsibility in nuclear disarmament. Though they have committed to
substantively reduce their nuclear arsenals, still much is expected from them.
Once the two nuclear powers substantially reduce their arsenals, the other P3
(i.e. France, U.K. and China) are expected to join the nuclear arms reduction
talks and processes. In the mean time it is expected that the P3 would refrain
from conducting nuclear weapons related development activities or increase
their arsenals. France and U.K. need to be commended for reducing their nuclear
arsenals, setting thus a good example for China to follow.
Nuclear capability is not a privilege for those that possess them, but
rather an added responsibility. Any misuse or abuse of their authority would
impel others, especially the nuclear capable States, to acquire nuclear capability.
Double standard in the approach to some nuclear related issues does not help
in raising confidence. Despite its relative success, the thirty years of non-
proliferation regime shows how the credibility of the P5 is gradually falling,
even though after the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences there was still
some hope that the P5 would at last live up to their commitments, especially to
the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This low credibility
provides opportunity for some nuclear capable States to opt openly for the
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nuclear option and for abolition of NPT, while for some others, parties to NPT,
to pursue their own clandestine weapons programs. Ignoring the situation and
non-recognition of the de facto nuclear-weapon States is not a viable option.
The changing political realities and new circumstances need new thinking from
the P5, thinking in much broader terms, in terms of the interests of the
international community as a whole.
This author believes that the 13 practical steps to advance systematically
and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the recommendations
of the Canberra Commission and of the Tokyo Forum in themselves (concerning
CTBT, FMCT, TMD and other issues) already represent broad possible road-
maps to address the nuclear non-proliferation and related issues. What is needed
is a realistic, practical and forward-looking approach on the part of the P5 and
agreement on concrete follow-up measures.
Role of non-nuclear-weapon States
The NNWSs, constituting the overwhelming majority of the international
community, also have an important role to play in promoting nuclear non-
proliferation through various international mechanisms and arrangements. Their
vast territories represent arenas of proliferation and possible use of nuclear
weapons. Moreover, violators of the NPT regime do not necessarily have to be
NWSs only. Although the NPT is the sole global mechanism in promoting and
strengthening nuclear non-proliferation, the revelations of the last few years
have amply demonstrated that both NWSs and NNWSs need to take tangible
steps to strengthen the NPT regime by addressing its weaknesses and dis-
balances, and ensuring strict implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty.
Accession of States to the IAEA Additional Protocol is important in this respect,
though by far not sufficient. The question of violations of NPT treaty obligations
needs clear response and action on the part of the international community,
without distinguishing whether the violators are NWSs, nuclear-capable States,
major non-nuclear powers or others. No one stands to benefit from the unraveling
of the regime. It is to be hoped that the 2005 NPT review conference would
focus on this issue one of its priorities.
Nuclear security assurances – litmus  test for the P5
One of the still sensitive issues on the non-proliferation agenda is
providing by NWSs of legally binding security assurances (SAs) to NNWSs
that are parties to NPT, i.e. going beyond the heavily conditional, half-hearted
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political assurances that had been given by the P5 in Security Council resolution
984 (1995). The “Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament”, adopted almost a decade ago at the 1995 NPT review and extension
conference, widely recognized the need for further steps to assure the NNWSs
party to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and
pointed out that these steps could take the form of an internationally legally
binding instrument.
Though negotiations on providing SAs to NNWSs parties to NPT are
slow, if not altogether stalled, they are being overtaken by  events , especially
by the changes in nuclear policies of some major nuclear-weapon States. Thus
the new U.S. national strategy to combat WMD underlines that U.S. might
retaliate with a nuclear strike in response not only to nuclear, but also chemical
or biological attacks on the U.S., its troops, or friend and allies. It is widely
believed that the above shift in nuclear policy, together with the doctrine of
pre-emptive strikes, could make the use or the thought of using nuclear weapons
more likely than any time before. Different States, obviously, are drawing
different conclusions from it. Therefore the negotiations on providing SAs to
NNWSs need to be vigorously pursued so as not to weaken further the NPT
regime. In this the NWSs are expected to play the leading role. Thus the assurance
that a nuclear attack will not be launched on a nuclear-weapon State from a
territory of a NNWS could easily be materialized if all NWSs pledge not to use
nuclear weapons first. Surely the post Cold War relations of the P5 would allow
them to make such pledges.
The above measure could be coupled with withdrawal of all nuclear
weapons from the territories of NNWSs4 or by excluding the use of nuclear
weapons from the protection given in military alliances. It should be noted that
all the above measures are within the exclusive power of NWSs which are the
owners of nuclear weapons and some are even leaders of military alliances. The
de facto emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States such as Israel, India,
Pakistan and DPRK (all in Asia) though complicates the equation, nevertheless
underlines the urgency of addressing this question in all it’s seriousness and in
all its aspects.
Nuclear weapons cannot be des-invented, though the existing ones can
be destroyed or, as temporary measure, could be placed under an agreed
international control. The question of nuclear weapons would not go away; it
4 Today U.S. nuclear weapons are still remain deployed in Belgium, Britain, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.
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can only be ignored at our own peril. There is thus an imperative need to
restrain nuclear-weapon proliferation, both vertical and horizontal. Vertical
proliferation, which is continuing, is inducing some nuclear-capable NNWSs
to go-nuclear and is thus promoting horizontal proliferation.
Growing importance of NWFZs
A few decades ago, at the height of the Cold War, the question of creation
of NWFZs was still more of a hypothetical and theoretical nature. Today it has
become a reality. By their very nature, NWFZs are called upon to play an
important supportive role in promoting non-proliferation5. They parallel and
complement the NPT. According to the latter, States parties have pledged not
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, not to receive the transfer of or control over such weapons as well as
not to receive or seek assistance in their manufacture. On the other hand, the
States forming part of NWFZs also undertook not to permit testing, use, storage,
installation or deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices on
their territory. According to NPT a NNWS party to the treaty is not prohibited
to allow nuclear weapons to be stationed and deployed on its territory, and
thus pose a security threat to other States, including to NWSs. On the other
hand, the States parties to NWFZs cannot pose such a threat because of the
total absence of nuclear weapons on their territory or on the territory of the
zone. Moreover, the scope of the verification regime of NWFZs goes beyond
the application of IAEA safeguards, which is empowered to insure only that
NNWSs do not divert nuclear material to build nuclear explosives. The IAEA
does not monitor such activities as clandestine import of nuclear weapons or
the use of territory by third States for manufacturing or testing of nuclear
weapons in NWFZs. Moreover, the regional control mechanisms, set up in
accordance with NWFZ treaties not only oversee and review the application of
IAEA safeguards system within their respective zones, but also provide
additional control measures reflecting the specifics of the zone (which can be
considered as peer pressure).
Today almost 2/3 of the members of the United Nations form part of
nuclear-weapon-free regional arrangements as arms control measures. They
cover the vast spaces of the Southern Hemisphere, including Latin America,
the entire continent of Africa, South-East Asia and the Pacific and have
5 Today 115 States with a combined population of 1.7 billion people covers, together
with Antarctica, over  50% of the world’s landmass
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contributed to development of a body of norms of international law on keeping
vast territories nuclear-weapon-free. This is a big and an important achievement.
However, still much more needs to be done not only to strengthen the regime,
but also to exclude the vast remaining territories of the planet from nuclear
weapons or their infrastructure6, especially regions of tension or potential
conflicts, including the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula.
Based on the experience of creation of four regional NWFZs, in 1999 UN
General Assembly adopted guidelines for the creation of future NWFZs7. These
guidelines, if followed, are expected to be supported by the P5. It is to be hoped
that these guidelines would be helpful first and foremost for the creation of
such a zone in the Middle East. In order to further improve the effectiveness of
existing and future NWFZs, such measures as making the NWFZ treaties
operational not only in peace time, but also in times of war, prohibiting attacks
on nuclear facilities of NWFZs, making unconditional the positive and negative
nuclear security assurances of NWSs, envisaging of actions or sanctions in
cases when a NWS violates a NWFZ treaty, strengthening of provisions against
nuclear waste dumping in NWFZ treaties, etc need to be undertaken. Together
with revitalizing the non-proliferation regime, these and other practical issues
need to be addressed both by States parties to NWFZS and by NWSs.
Asian nuclear challenges
Besides the fact that in 1945 Japan was subject to devastating effects of
the then rudimentary nuclear weapons, there is probably no place today in the
world where nuclear proliferation concerns are more acute than Asia. It is home
of what S.B. Cohen, called the shatterbelt regions, i.e. large, strategically located
regions with conflicting States that are also caught between conflicting interests
of great powers. Asia is a continent which witnesses rivalries and lacks both
regional arms-control mechanisms and adequate transparency. The only existing
arms control regimes are the Rarotonga and Bangkok NWFZs, while the region
is also home to 2 jure de and 2 de facto nuclear-weapon States, to an aspiring
State and a number of nuclear capable States. Though the threat of Iraqi WMDs
seems to be having been exaggerated in 2003, the questions pertaining to
Iranian nuclear-weapon program is still the focus of attention of arms control
6 Theoretically territories of over 75 States (excluding those of de jure and de facto
nuclear-weapons States)
7 see UNGA official records. Fifty-fourth session. Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42):
“Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived
at among the States of the region concerned”
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experts. The developments on and around the Korean peninsula demonstrate
the urgency of taking effective measures to address the question of de-
nuclearization of the peninsula which, if allowed to continue, could destabilize
not only the peninsula, the Northeast Asia, but the entire non-proliferation
regime. The six party talks are seen today as a possible mechanism for tackling
this issue, though the first two rounds are giving the impression that the major
parties are more poised to mark time and score propaganda points than negotiate
in earnest.
When tackling the nuclear issue one should bear in mind its economic
dimension and prospects of peaceful nuclear development as well. Thus the
role of nuclear energy in Northeast Asia has the tendency to increase. If by mid
1990s the share of nuclear energy in ROK was 36%, in Taiwan 28.8% and in
Japan 33.8%, it is estimated that by 2010 almost 1/2 of the world’s nuclear
energy will be produced and consumed in this region. Therefore along with the
question of nuclear weapons, the questions of nuclear wastes, especially high
level radiological waste (HLW), and other nuclear related questions need to be
addressed8.
Mongolia’s nuclear environment, national security concept
Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament processes are not the
responsibility of NWSs alone, as mentioned above. If in bilateral disarmament
processes NNWSs cannot play a direct role, in multilateral negotiations on
non-proliferation and creation of NWFZs they can play a very important role.
With respect to the latter even the States that due to their geographical location
cannot form part of regional NWFZs can nevertheless contribute to
consolidation and expansion of NWFZs, and set positive precedents, including
in addressing nuclear and other security related issues simultaneously or in
package.
For most of the post World War II period Mongolia has been an active, if
not enthusiastic, participant in two ideological cold wars: East-West and Sino-
Soviet. The latter led to the stationing of Soviet troops in Mongolia which were
equipped not only with a conventional arsenal but also with some weapons of
8 At present HLW is put into interim storage which it has to sit for 30-40 years for its
radioactivity and heat production to decline. Being still highly hazardous HLW then needs
to be stored somewhere permanently. Most HLW, the most dangerous kind, is spent fuel
from over 400 nuclear power reactors in more than 30 countries. The question of
permanent nuclear waste repositories is the most controversial nuclear issue after the
question of nuclear-weapon proliferation.
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mass destruction. At the height of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, when a “limited”
nuclear exchange appeared a possibility, Mongolia faced the danger of being
involuntarily drawn into the nuclear standoff, if not something more ominous.
That Cold War experience prompted Mongolia – when the Soviets/Russians
withdrew their troops and their weapons in the early 1990s – to declare its
territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The National Security Concept of
Mongolia, adopted in 1994, declared that thenceforth Mongolia’s foreign policy
would be based on political realism, non-alignment, pursuit of its own national
interests, and participation in international efforts to strengthen international
peace and security.
With respect to Mongolia’s two nuclear-weapon-wielding neighbors,
which during the Sino-Soviet dispute considered Mongolia an important military
buffer or factor, the Concept underlined the importance of maintaining balanced
relationships, neutrality in their bilateral disputes, and developing mutually
beneficial cooperation with each one of them. Addressing the nuclear aspect of
security, the Concept called for ensuring the nuclear-weapon-free status of
Mongolia at the international level and for making it an important element of
efforts to strengthen the country’s security by political means.
Mongolia declares itself a NWFZ
The first step in turning Mongolia into a NWFZ was made at the United
Nations.
In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September
1992 Mongolian President P. Ochirbat formally declared Mongolia’s territory a
nuclear-weapon-free zone, adding that his country would work to have that
status internationally guaranteed. President Ochirbat’s address was important
because by declaring Mongolia’s territory nuclear-weapon-free, he was in fact
saying that the country would not take sides with either one of its neighbors or
allow its territory to be used by one neighbor against the other.  In future
nuclear calculations Mongolia wanted to be transparent and predictable. By
doing so it was not only affirming independence of its foreign policy, but also
trying to define its place and role in future Asian nuclear equation, and in future
Asian security mechanism or architecture that would eventually emerge in the
region.
In January 1993 in the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation
signed between Mongolia and the Russian Federation, the latter pledged to
respect Mongolia’s prohibition of the deployment on or transit through its
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territory of foreign troops and weapons of mass destruction. In October of that
year, China followed suit and declared that it welcomed and supported Mongolia
as a nuclear-weapon-free state and that it would respect Mongolia’s decision
to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.  The other three nuclear-weapon States
that is the United States, France and Britain also expressed their support for the
initiative9. Thus the United States (the position of which influenced that of
Britain and France), in its statement in October 1993, underlined the applicability
of its negative and positive security assurances to Mongolia. It also stated that
if Mongolia ever faced a threat and referred the matter to the UN Security
Council, the United States would consider appropriate steps. It is worth noting
that the U.S. pledge referred not only to a possible nuclear threat but also to
external threats to Mongolia in general. Soon, the Non-Aligned Movement10
also expressed full support for the initiative.
It is obvious that political support, however broad, cannot in itself create
a credible regime or zone. The discussions and negotiations that Mongolia
held bilaterally with members of the P5 in 1993-95 on the ways and means of
institutionalizing its status revealed that though they supported in principle
the initiative, nevertheless were cautious about setting a precedent for other
States to set up single-State NWFZs, thus complicating, in their view, the post-
cold war geopolitical landscape, their nuclear calculations as well as undermining,
as they saw, the incentives for States to create traditional (regional) zones. At
the same time the P5 avoided engaging in discussing the initiative in-depth
bilaterally, each one advising Mongolia to consult on the matter with the other
4 members. Such stalling or foot-dragging tactics lasted about two years. Then
they changed tactics and declared that on nuclear issues they acted as a group
and therefore Mongolia was expected to approach them as a group. Based on
the broad political support for its policy and following the P5 suggestion
Mongolia decided to take concrete steps within the UN to have its status
defined and internationally recognized. Since the U.S. acted more decisively
than the rest, it was decided that Mongolia’s main P5 contact would the U.S.
9 Their support was both expression of their support for Mongolia’s bold policy and at
the same time a way of getting Mongolia’s support for the indefinite extension of NPT in
1995.
10 The Non-Alignment Movement, established in 1961 at the height of the Cold War,
is an international coalition of 114 States supporting the principle of non-alignment
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Negotiating with the P5
Mongolia’s first attempt to get the needed P5 and others’ attention was to
propose in 1996 the creation of a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
(CANWFZ) with the participation of Mongolia as one of the zonal States.  This
immediately drew opposition from Mongolia’s immediate neighbors – Russia
and China.  Their argument was, and most probably rightly so, that since
Mongolia did not border on any of the other Central Asian States, it was
impossible for them to agree to have Mongolia included in the future CANWFZ.
Bearing in mind the difficulties of its immediate neighbors, Mongolia (and
Kyrgyzstan, the other co-sponsor of a draft resolution on supporting CANWFZ)
did not press for any action to be taken at the 1996 session of the General
Assembly.
Having been rebutted on the proposal of creating a CANWFZ with its
participation, in 1997 Mongolia proposed at the session of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission to consider the concept of a single-State zone as a
non-traditional way of creating NWFZs. Though some member States supported
the idea believing that not all States could be part of regional agreements or
that the single-State zone could later develop into a regional zone, the P5 opposed
it as a concept, as something unconventional that could, as they said, undermine
(?!?!) the incentives for States to create traditional zones. For them consideration
of a novel,  non-traditional approach was out of question. To make their point
to Mongolia, U.S., France and U.K.  jointly made simultaneous demarches in
Ulaanbaatar, Geneva and New York, saying that pushing for a single-State
NWFZ resolution at the General Assembly would be “premature, unhelpful and
possibly counterproductive”. That position of the P3 (which was tacitly
supported by Russia and China) prompted Mongolia and the P5 to search for a
way to accommodate some of Mongolia’s demands as well as the P5’s position.
As a result of negotiations it was agreed that Mongolia’s unique
geopolitical situation (which included its unique location, non-alignment with
any of its neighbors or with any other major power, non- membership in any
military alliance or bloc) required equally unique, innovative approach and
solution. It was thus agreed that the P5 would recognize and support Mongolia’s
unique status, but not as a zone in a traditional sense, but as a “unique case”.
The NWSs also recognized and agreed that a broader approach to Mongolia’s
security was required for its status to be more credible and viable. That
understanding formed the basis of the 1998 United Nations General Assembly
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resolution 53/77 D entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-
weapon-free status”11.
Being a compromise, the resolution deliberately did not define Mongolia’s
status, which was left for Mongolia itself to define, bearing in mind not only its
national interests, but also international practice and the legitimate interests of
its immediate neighbors. The resolution reflected the understanding of the
need for a broader approach to Mongolia’s security as a way to making the
future status more viable, and perhaps making it an element or a factor in future
regional security arrangement(s).
Mindful of Mongolia’s own role in defining the status, in February 2000
the State Great Hural (parliament) of Mongolia adopted a special legislation on
Mongolia’s status: a law and a resolution. The content of the law is to some
extent similar to the basic provisions of international  treaties on the creation of
NWFZs12.  It couldn’t have been otherwise, since these instruments reflected
the best and agreed practice of creation of such zones. Besides, it was believed
that doing otherwise would have given the P5 an excuse not to support the
legislation.  When the legislation was adopted and its content officially
communicated to the P5, a long silence ensued. Then it was communicated to
the Mongolian side that the legislation was an internal affair of Mongolia and
that is why the P5 would not comment on its content. This surprised the
Mongolian side since the provisions of the legislation dealt with nuclear-weapon
related issues, with many of them having effect well beyond Mongolian territory.
On the other hand, it is a common practice that not only nuclear and security
related legislation, but even human rights related legislation of many States are
made “their business” by some of the P5. Therefore this approach of the P5
cannot be considered but as a clear manifestation of double standard, if not
outright discrimination. To this day the P5 have not officially reacted to the
legislation.
11 see the text of UNGA resolution A/53/77D.
12 The main provisions of the law deal with definition of such notions as “nuclear
weapon” and “nuclear-weapon-free status”, prohibitions resulting from the NWFS, uses of
nuclear energy and technology, verification and liability. According to the law the prohibited
activities include not only development, manufacturing or otherwise acquiring, possessing
or having control over nuclear weapons, but also stationing or transporting nuclear weapons
by any means, testing or using nuclear weapons as well as dumping or disposing nuclear-
weapons grade radioactive material or nuclear waste. The law also banned transportation
of nuclear weapons, parts thereof or nuclear waste through the territory of Mongolia. See
document A/55/56 – S/2000/160 of 29 February, 2000
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Though the term negotiations has was used in this sub-heading, it should
be pointed out that almost no negotiations in the traditional sense took place
between the representatives of Mongolia and the P5, i.e. defining the problem,
committing to a negotiated solution of the pending issues, developing a
framework and actually negotiating and agreeing. The P5 avoided directly
discussing the pending issues with Mongolia and their representative could
not commit himself to any definite stance, always referring to the divergent
positions of each member of the P5.
P5 joint statement on security assurances
The aim of any NWFZ is not to have it acknowledged as such by other
States but to practically contribute to the goal of non-proliferation and  to
receive clear nuclear SAs from NWSs,  i.e. from the P5. Mongolia, in compliance
with operative para. 3 of UNGA resolution 53/77 D, which invited Member
States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, to consolidate and strengthen
Mongolia’s  external security, proposed that measures be undertaken  to provide
Mongolia with SAs. Thus in 1999 it proposed to the P5 that a legal instrument
be adopted that would reaffirm the P5’s commitment to respect Mongolia’s
independence, sovereignty and its nuclear-weapon-free status, to refrain from
the threat or use of force, including nuclear, refrain from political or economic
coercion, to undertake consultations with Mongolia and among themselves on
the measures to ensure the status and Mongolia’s external security, and to
agree to seek immediate UN Security Council action in case Mongolia’s security
was threatened. The P5 agreed, though reluctantly, to address this issue.
Having consulted among themselves and without follow-up consultations
with Mongolia, the P5 have announced that they were prepared make a joint
statement on SAs to Mongolia “in connection with the latter’s NWFS”. They
stated categorically that no negotiations were possible on the content as well as
the form of the statement.  Mongolia was hoping that the P5, bearing in mind its
unique case, including its geopolitical location, its past role of an involuntary
military buffer, its stark imbalance in political, economic and military power as
compared to its neighbors, its status of non-alignment with any great power and
of not belonging to any political or military alliance or security arrangement, etc.,
they would provide jointly or separately both political as well as nuclear SAs in
the manner that they had provided earlier to Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus13.
13 i.e. to respect Mongolia’s independence and sovereignty, refrain from the threat or use
of force, refrain from economic coercion and provide negative and positive nuclear SAs
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The P5 joint statement was made on 5 October 2000 in the First Committee
of United Nations General Assembly14. It reaffirmed their commitment to
cooperate with Mongolia in implementation of resolution 53/77D  and declared
that the general positive SAs made in Security Council resolution 984(1995) as
well as their unilateral negative SAs made in April 1995 applied to Mongolia (?!)
and that the two immediate neighbors confirmed legally binding commitments
undertaken by them with respect to Mongolia “though the conclusion of
bilateral treaties with Mongolia regarding these matters”.
When reading out the statement, the U.S. representative made clear that
the statement was being made because of Mongolia’s “good standing” as
regards to NPT and that its unique geographic status needed unique approach.
He underlined that the P5 believed that their action would further strengthen
the NPT by demonstrating their flexibility in responding to the security concerns
of NPT NNWSs in special situations (?!). It was also pointed out that the P5
hence had fully carried out the commitment to Mongolia they undertook as
NWSs, consistent with the terms of resolution 33/77D15.
The joint statement did not represent political nor nuclear SA. Instead of
providing Mongolia with the assurance to respect its sovereignty and
independence, to respect its nuclear-weapon-free status, not to use or threaten
to use force, including nuclear weapons, against it, and not to contribute to any
act which would constitute violations of the status, the P5 simply declared that
they reaffirmed their commitment to Mongolia to cooperate in the implementation
of resolution 33/77 D, their commitment for positive nuclear security assurances
reflected in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and reaffirmed, “in case of
Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in
their 1995 separate declarations”16. The joint statement did not add anything to
the existing Mongolian status.
The statement did not elaborate on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status
but rather in no uncertain terms it underlined that Mongolia did not enjoy any
special status beyond that of a NNWS party to NPT. It was a perfect example of
making a statement without breaking new ground. In short, in response to
General Assembly’s request to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia’s external
security, the P4 pledged that under certain conditions they would not to use
nuclear weapons against Mongolia. For Russia this statement was even a step
14 see UN document a/55/530 – S/2000/1052 of 27 October, 2000
15 see document A/55/C.1/PV.6
16 see document A/55/530 – S/2000/1052 of 31 October 2000
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backward from its commitment under the 1992 treaty that in its relations with
Mongolia it would abide by the principle of …non-use or threat of use of force.
Only China’s position that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against any NNWS or NWFZ at any time under any circumstances was partially
reassuring. Partially, because what Mongolia was expecting from the P5 was
reaffirmation of the assurance on the non-use or threat of use of force, as it had
been the case with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus. When writing this, the
author by no means is implying that any one of the P5 has intention to threaten
or use force against Mongolia. The reason that it is pointed out here is to show
how partial steps and half hearted measures can create more problems than
actually solving the issue.
Para. 4 of the P5 statement stated that the People’s Republic of China and
the Russian Federation ... confirmed the legally binding commitments
undertaken by them with respect to Mongolia through the conclusion of bilateral
treaties with Mongolia regarding these matters. Russia, in the friendship treaty
with Mongolia mentioned above, indeed pledged to “respect Mongolia’s policy
of not admitting the deployment on and transit through its territory of foreign
troops, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.”17  That provision,
important as it may be, cannot be seen as sufficient to be considered as nuclear
SA. What Mongolia was hoping to acquire in nuclear terms from Russia and
China was not so much a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons,
important as they may be, but rather a pledge to respect the status, cooperate
in the strengthening of the status as well as not to engage in, authorize,
contribute to or encourage in any way the performance of acts that could lead
to destabilization and hence violation of its sovereignty, security interests and
the special status.
As to China, to this day no bilateral legally binding commitment has been
made to Mongolia regarding its status nor regarding the nuclear SA, although
on 22 October 1993 the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of China welcomed
and expressed support for Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free State and declared
that its pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZs
and States applied to Mongolia18. Mongolia was hoping that China’s
reaffirmation of its nuclear pledge would be accompanied by a pledge not to
contribute at any time and under any circumstances at any act that would
constitute violation of Mongolia’s NWFS.
17 see United Nations General Assembly document A/CN.10/195 of 22 April 1997, p.3
18 ibid.
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Despite the above-mentioned shortcomings and undeterred by the content
of the P5 joint statement, Mongolia welcomed it as a first step, as a sign of
political will on the part of the P5 to implement resolution 53/77D. That is why
it qualified the joint statement as an important step towards institutionalizing
Mongolia’s status at the international level. Mongolia took the opportunity to
reaffirm its readiness to cooperate with all the member States of the Unite
Nations and the relevant UN bodies in enhancing the effectiveness and
strengthening the credibility of the status19.
In search for the ways of acquiring SAs from the P5, in early 2001 Mongolia
tried to see if a United Nations Security Council resolution could be adopted or
a statement of the President of the Council be made in this regard. The
consultations revealed that though the non-permanent members of the Council
were open-minded, the P5 were reluctant, saying that that would set a precedent,
as if precedent setting necessarily meant something “bad”, as if international
relations do not develop through precedent setting events. It was indicated
that the P5 needed more time to positively review their position. However, the
P5 joint statement as well as their reluctance to address the issue of SAs cannot
ignore the fact that even after General Assembly resolutions 53/77D and 55/
33S20, after the joint statement of the P5 on this issue, the content of the “status”
from international legal point of view still remained undefined and thus unclear.
Sapporo spirit
Bearing the above in mind the United Nations, with the support of the
Sapporo prefecture of Japan, sponsored in Sapporo city in September 2001 an
independent expert group meeting of representatives of the P5 and Mongolia
to try to identify the “status” and the ways of strengthening it. At the meeting
the Mongolian representative underlined that since its delegation could not
agree with the P5 view that the Mongolian legislation had no international
relevance and that the “status” was no more than recognition by the P5 of a
“NNWS in good standing with NPT”, this difference in  approach to Mongolia’s
status created difficulty in the implementation of UNGA resolution. Moreover
he pointed out that none of the relevant international documents elaborated on
the content of the “status” and that is why the Mongolian delegation looked
forward to defining the status.
19 see UN document A/54/491 – S/2000/994
20 the second UNGA resolution on the item adopted in 2000
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After two days of meeting, the experts agreed that “Mongolia did not …
enjoy  legally defined international nuclear-weapon-free status”21. The experts
concluded that the best way to strengthen the status would be to conclude a
trilateral (Mongolia + two immediate neighbors) or multilateral (Mongolia + P5)
agreement that would define both the international status and the content of
SAs to be provided by the P5. As a follow-up to those recommendations, in
2002 Mongolia approached its immediate neighbors and presented them the
draft elements of a possible future agreement, to which the neighbors in principle
responded positively. They perhaps realized that providing assurances, even
political, to an unidentified “status” was neither logical nor credible.
Other nuclear-related issues
Besides being completely surrounded by two great powers with nuclear
arsenals, Mongolia is also surrounded by “silent” nuclear threats, i.e. by over
two dozen nuclear installations and facilities (which, if mismanaged, could be
potential “Chernobyls”) and nuclear waste repositories (where the neighbors
are storing spent nuclear fuel). Thus Russia has officially confirmed possession
of 200 mln. tons of national nuclear waste, from low to highly toxic ones.
Moreover, according to Russia’s Minister for Nuclear Industry, it is planning,
on commercial basis, to become an international repository for radioactive
nuclear wastes. The largest repository would be in the area of Krasnoyarsk, on
the north of Mongolia22. Not only is China’s nuclear industry producing its
“own” nuclear wastes, but it has displayed high interest in becoming a
commercial importer of nuclear wastes from abroad. Thus in mid-1980s it was
seeking to import nuclear wastes from Western Europe. In 2000 it was negotiating
commercial arrangements of accepting 200 000 drums of radioactive waste from
Taiwan’s nuclear power plants23, most probably to be deposited in the Gansu
province, that borders with Mongolia. Since the P5 do not have agreements
with IAEA on strict and rigorous inspection of their nuclear facilities, the
question of safety of facilities and repositories in Russia and China acquire
special significance for Mongolia.
21 see UN document A/57/59 of 20 March 2002
22 see “Russia Sees Payoff in Storing Nuclear Wastes from Other Nations”.  The New
York Times. 26 May, 2001.  Also “Will Russia be nuclear waste dumping ground?” Argumenty
y Fakty.  No. 17, 2002
23 see “China and Taiwan Pursue Secret Nuclear Waste Deal”  The New York Times, 14
March, 2000
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The third neighbor that does not directly border with Mongolia -
Kazakhstan - has 233.000 tons of its own radiation waste to be made safe and
large quantities of contaminated equipment. Kazakhstan, following the example
of Russia, has openly expressed interest, on commercial basis, to store on its
territory low or intermediate-level nuclear waste from other countries24.
Non-nuclear aspects of security
In Mongolia’s case the non-nuclear aspects of security is as important as
its nuclear-weapon-free status, since the former directly affects the latter’s
credibility and sustainability. Non-nuclear aspects of Mongolia’s security are
additional security safeguards that Mongolia would not be influenced or
manipulated to alter or “make exceptions” with regard to its nuclear-weapon-
free status. That is why implementation of resolution 53/77 D implies broadening
of Mongolia’s foreign relations and expanding its outreach. In recent years it
joined the World Trade Organization, became dialogue partner of ARF, was
admitted to the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and is
taking part in some of the working group meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), pending its full membership. Bearing in mind its location
and economic realities, measures are being taken to address Mongolia’s
economic vulnerability and ecological challenges. Having recognized the
importance of non-nuclear aspects of Mongolia’s security in principle, the P5
are expected to work with Mongolia in addressing them.
Mongolia’s case in the regional context
Mongolia is the world’s first UN-recognized State with a special nuclear-
weapon-free status that also bans transit of nuclear weapons through its
territory25. However it is not the first attempt in Asia by individual States to
officially ban nuclear weapons on their territory. In the Asia-Pacific region, in
early 1980’s the Government of New Zealand adopted a legislation26 that banned
nuclear weapons on its territory. However, no follow-up measures have been
taken by New Zealand to institutionalize the status at the international level.
In 1983 Australia proposed the establishment of a NWFZ in the South
Pacific and as a result of negotiations among the South Pacific Forum members
24 It is believed that it would take 200.000 years for intermediate-level waste to decay
to be sufficiently to be safe
25 Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz “Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation”.
2002
26 New Zeland Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act, 1987
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the Rarotonga treaty was signed in August 1985.  The treaty prohibits the
manufacture or acquisition by other means, as well as the possession or control
of not only nuclear weapons, but of any nuclear explosive device by the countries
of the zone. Moreover, the treaty bans dumping radioactive matter at sea
anywhere within the zone. The weakness of the treaty is that it allows each
State party to make an exception for nuclear weapons that may be abroad
foreign ships visiting its ports or navigating its territorial sea or archipelagic
waters, and for weapons that may be abroad foreign aircraft visiting its airfields
or transiting its airspace.
Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region, the Philippines have reflected in its
Constitution the goal to be nuclear-weapon free.  This desire of the Philippines
and of other ASEAN countries materialized in 1995 when the SEANWFZ treaty
was signed. It marked a new ground by foreseeing “fact-finding missions” to
clarify and resolve ambiguous situations as well as by requiring States parties
to subject their peaceful nuclear energy programs to strict nuclear safety
assessments and dispose radioactive wastes and other radioactive material
consistent with IAEA recommended guidelines and standards.
In 1970s Nepal tried to turn its territory into a zone of peace, while Ceylon
(Sri Lanka) proposed to turn the entire Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Since
mid-1970s some of the countries of the Middle East have been proposing to
turn that volatile region, which is partly in Asia, into a NWFZ. The five Central
Asian states are finalizing the draft treaty that would turn that vast region in the
heart of Asia into a NWFZ. Proposals have also been made to create a NWFZ
in South Asia, though with its proponent – Pakistan – becoming a de facto
nuclear-weapon State, the proposal seems to be abandoned, at least for now.
Studies are also being undertaken on the possibility of creating a NWFZ
for Northeast Asia (NWFZ-NEA)27 or a Limited-Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
for Northeast Asia (LNWFZ-NEA)28. In early 1990s in the Joint declaration on
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the two Koreas have pledged to
denuclearize the peninsula. All these testify to the growing interest of the
States of the Asian continent, like those of other parts of the world, to outlaw
nuclear weapons on their territory or in their region.
Mongolia’s case vividly demonstrates that given good will, determination
and innovative approach, each State can make its unique contribution to
27 see Andrew Mack. A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone: Problems and Prospects (in
Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia). 1990. Also Xia Liping. Nuclear-weapon-free zones:
Lessons for non-proliferation in Northeast Asia. 2001
28 Xia Liping, ibid.
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strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and enhance predictability, and thus
contribute to regional security and stability. Unique cases should not only be
acknowledged as such, but also need to be approached constructively and
creatively for the attainment of the common goals. To achieve this,
understanding and cooperation of the immediate neighboring States are very
important. With increasing peaceful uses, nuclear related issues are acquiring
multiple dimensions that need innovative approaches and solutions, especially
new thinking on the part of the P5. Clinging to old solutions, trying to address
today’s problems with yesterday’s solutions  or half solutions in this fast
changing world would only create more problems. Since many issues are inter-
linked, in many cases they need to be approached holistically. The broad
approach used in Mongolia’s case, addressing simultaneously nuclear and
non-nuclear aspects of security, could be useful in other “special” or
“exceptional” cases, including when approaching the DPRK’s nuclear problem.
If Mongolia and its supporters prevail, the notion of single-State NWFZ could
become a reality, and not a remote theoretical probability, enabling the countries,
that by geography or otherwise cannot form part of traditional regional zones,
to follow suit and ensure their own security by political means and contribute
to that of the region.
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
The North Korean nuclear problem is an issue that can determine not
only the geopolitical landscape of Northeast Asia and of the Asian continent in
general, but also the future and viability of the non-proliferation regime. Allowing
the DPRK, party to NPT, to withdraw from it and pursue nuclear weapons and
nuclear capability option would have serious consequences for regional arms
race, including nuclear arms race. It would also surely affect the non-proliferation
regime as the world knows.
The North Korean nuclear issue has a long history. One of the high points
in the attempts to denuclearize the peninsula was the signing in January of 1992
of a joint North and South Korean Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. Adopted almost simultaneously with the “Agreement on
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchange and Cooperation between the
South and the North”, it represented an important first step in turning the
peninsula into a NWFZ. By its content, the joint denuclearization agreement
went beyond the provisions of NPT and of creation of a NWFZ, and was hailed
as such. Thus the agreement banned both sides from possessing uranium
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enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, and as such was seen by the
international community, if implemented, as substantially strengthening the
non-proliferation regime. Mongolia, like many other countries, welcomed the
agreement and expressed the hope that its full realization would be followed
soon. The modality of verification, the role of “challenge inspections” and
some other issues needed to be agreed upon. The ensuing events and
complications have not permitted implementation of the agreement. DPRK’s
membership of NPT as well as implementation in full by all its parties of the 1994
Agreed Framework provide a concrete roadmap for denuclearizing the peninsula.
The grievances of the parties should be addressed and, if deemed reasonable,
taken into account in the search for a lasting solution. Acrimonious rhetoric will
not help address the real issues but rather aggravate the situation.
The question of nuclear weapons and the threat that they pose to a
region affect the interests of all the States of that particular region and thus
cannot be considered a mere bilateral issue. Nor can other nuclear issues be
taken lightly if they would somehow affect national security interests of other
States.  Withdrawal of DPRK from the NPT does not solve the proliferation
problem. In fact it complicates the issue and could set a precedent for future
would be proliferators. The only way out of the present situation is a political
and diplomatic one, by focusing not only on the nuclear issues, but also the
political context of denuclearization and addressing the non-nuclear aspects of
security of North and South Koreas in conjunction with the wider security
issues and implications. In Korea’s case the negotiations would succeed only
if they are accompanied by effective confidence-building measures.
Mongolia supports broad negotiated settlement of the DPRK nuclear
issue on the basis of ensuring the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula,
establishing normal relations with it and providing it with traditional security
guarantees. In that sense the fact that the current talks involve six parties with
common as well as different interests and incentives are a welcome sign.
Focusing solely on nuclear weapons aspects would not lead to a permanent
solution. Nor would half-hearted solutions end in fully successful outcome.
Though the talks directly involve only six parties, its outcome has regional and
even global implications. Therefore other States or groups of States need to
support indirectly the talks by indicating their position, and especially their
readiness to actively promote realization of the agreements to be reached. On a
number of occasions Mongolia expressed its readiness to support any efforts
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and initiatives aimed at making the Korean Peninsula a region of peace, mutual
trust and international cooperation29.
Conclusion
The nuclear landscape in the Asian heartland, like in the rest of Asia and
the world, is rapidly changing. The NPT regime has not been able to adequately
freeze horizontal or vertical proliferation. If not addressed properly, the regime
could gradually unravel with all the ensuing consequences for world peace,
stability and security. It is difficult to address today’s nuclear-related issues
based on the thinking or mindset of 1970s or even of 1990s. Due to realities of
power the role of nuclear-weapon States is important today as it was during the
Cold War. However, with the changing circumstances and emerging new realities
the role of other States, especially nuclear capable States is increasing. These
new realities demand that the P5 adopt a new thinking in line with the emerging
realities. Mongolia’s case is exactly a case in point, even if it is not a burning
issue. In line with that the Korean case demonstrates that the question of
denuclearization of DPRK needs to be addressed in a broader regional context
as well as by addressing DPRK’s wider security interests and needs. The issue
is not a military one, but a political and legal. The challenge is to find such a
solution that would be politically acceptable to all the parties concerned, and
that would at the same time discourage others from weakening the non-
proliferation regime. The only way to do that is through negotiations and
reviewing the weaknesses of the NPT regime. In that respect the questions of
strengthening of the NPT regime and halting vertical proliferation should be
duly addressed by the next NPT review conference in 2005.
29 see Statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia
dated 13 August, 2003
